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Just at the point that I fhishd this article,
Congress acted to limit the effects that kgal
mimiage would have, if Hawaii or any other
a t e moved to pennit same-sex couples to
many. The new '''Defof M g e Act"

declares that all federal statutes and
regulations that refer to mimed persons or
to spouses shall be read as applying to
oppositeex couples cmly This article
persists in reviewing both federal and state
laws that bear on d e d pawns, for the
purpose of my exendse of imagination the "what if?-is to ask how opposite-sex
married p e m are treated yncier the law
today and hold these laws up to the
situations of lesbian and gay male coupla.

'

I. Postures towanl marriage
A large proportion of American adults
who identdy themselves as lesbian or gay I
live with another pemn of the same sex and
regard that person as their life partner.
Exactly how many gay or lesbian adult& .
there are in the United States and what
proportion live with another in a long-term
relationshp are not possible to calculate on
the basis of exhting information. Still, every
nwey of adult Americans willing to iden*
hemselves as lesbian or gay h d s that a
,
majoIity or a near majority are living
currently with a partner. Tncxtashg numbexs
of these couples are celebrating their
relationships in cezernonies of commitment.
Those who pimiupate c o d y refer to the
c- g- r- a.. w k s p weddings and to t$ym&v%
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Exaay what lesbians wd gay nn_.hw
to obtain from legal marriage i,s u n e i
Since public ceremonies sf cornmitment~m
already so aommon, one might expect
when debating state-sanctimed.marriage
they would E
o
m on what law itself can_ ., accord that other Mh1ti0115 cannot:
of legally protected benefits and
imposed obligations. In fna,they do o a
.'
the vigofyws public chussian, few - .
advocates address at my length thk
&quenm
of marliage. Wllllam
for example, devotes only six of the 261
pages in hjs h e new book, ~ h e cfor~,,,:. .
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That the social meanlngs of slate
lecogni~~on
draw so much attention is
nonetheless understandable In our country,
as in most societies throughout the world,
lnarnage IS the single most significant
communal ceremony of belongng In a lawdienched country such as ours, pem~isslon
fol same-sex couples to many under the law
would s~gnlfythe acceptance of lesblans and
gay men as equal cltlzens more profoundly
than any other nondiscnmina~ionlaws that
m~ghtbe adopted
Skeptics about mamage wthin the
lesblan and gay communities also largely
ignore [he legal consequences of mamage
They focus instead on the negative meanings
they attach to the institution itself To many,
mamage sign~fieshierarchy and dominance,
subjugation and the graves of countless
generations of marned couples, one stone
reads "Herbert Smith," the other simply
reads "Wife " And even ~f the legal institution
of marnage has changed in lhe recent past,
they reslst the assimilaton of queer couples
into an oppressive heterosexual orthodoxy of
ascnbed roles and domesllc~ty
p
c

11. The legal consequences of marriage

Each of the fifty states defines the
incidents of marriage for its residents.
Federa! laws add hundreds of other legal
consequences. Some scholars have
characterized the multitude of legal attributes
of marriage today as largely incoherent, and
in their details they surely are. Yet it is
possible to identify lhree central categories of
regulation, within each of whch a certain
coherence obtains: some laws r e c o p e
affective or emotional bonds that most
people entering marriage express for each
other; some build upon assumptions about
mamage as creating an environment that is
especially promising or appropriate for the
raising of children; and some build on
assun~ptions(or prescriptive views) about
the economic arrangements that are likely
to exist (or that ought to exist) between
partners.
As you read, you will encounter
occasional ghosts from an authoritarian and
foimally gendered past. The laws dealing
with married persons have undergone a
massive transformation during the last
century Well into the nineteenth century all
assets of a married couple, including those
that the wife brought into a marrigae, were
controlled by the husband. In fact, her
personal property became his property The
husband also, as a matter of law, controlled
all decisions that related to a married
couple's children. This male-controlled
relationship was also dilficult or impossible

to leave. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, maniage was indissoluble under the
laws of nearly all states. Later in the century
it was dissoluble, but only on proof by one
sinless spouse of a serious marital sin
committed by the other.
Today, legislatures or judicial decisions
have removed virtually all rules that
explicilly provide different status or authority
for husbands. They also permit marriage to
end without proof of marital fault. The
compulsory and sex-linked aspects of the
law of mamage have, during the latter half of
ths century, been withering away, sometimes
at the price of providing insufficient
protection to women economically illpositioned to protect themselves. As we will
see, for example, the rules of divorce
commonly treat mamage as a partnership
with an equal division of property, but,
because of their lower earnings, women are
generally left sipficantly worse off
financially than men are. Most gay and
lesbian couples can, however, appropriately
regard the legal aspects of marriage today as
serving primarily, though not entirely, a
facilitating function - offering couples
opportunities to shape satisfying lives as
formal equals and as they, rather than the
state, see fit.

A. Regulations that recognize emotional
attachments

Some laws and regulations dealing
expressly with married persons can best be
viewed today as promoting the emotional
attachments that most spouses feel toward
each other. Here are a few examples. Statutes
or common law doctrine in all states grant
decisionmalung powers to relatives when a
person becomes incompetent to make
decisions for herself. Two broadly different
sorts of laws exist. The more narrow sort
authorizes a family member to make an
emergency medical decision when a person
has become incompetent and has failed to
execute a formal document authorizing some
other person to make decisions on her
behalf. When such incapacity arises for an
unmarried person, state laws designate a
parent or an offspring or some other blood
relation as decisionmalier, but, for persons
who are man-ied, they typically turn first to
the person's spouse. The second sort of law,
broader in scope, provides for tlze formal
appointment of a "guardian" or
"conservator,"who typically makes not only
medical decisions but other decisions about

residence, care, and financial matters. These
statues also differ widely, but corninonly
provide first for the appointment of a blood
relative for a single person and a spouse for a
married person. The Uniform Probate Code,
for example, has been adopted in fourteen
states, and establishes an order or preference
for the appointment of relatives as the
guardian for an incapacitated person, wlth
the spouse first in line, followed by an adult
clzild or a parent. Upon death, other laws or
court decisions provide that [he spouse has
first right as "next of W to claim a person's
remains and to malie anatomical gfts of
parts of the deceased person's body when the
deceased person has made no directive of
her own.
In a similar manner, state laws designate
the spouse as the person to receive part or all
of a married person's assets when he or she
dies without a will. These "intestacy" laws
vary widely among the states. In some states,
if there are surviving children, a spouse
receives as little as a thrd; 11-1many others,
a fixed dollar amount and a share of the
remainder; in still others, the entire estate.
In most states, if there are no sunriving
chldren and no suniving parents, the
spouse receives e v e q h n g .
The laws relating to incompetency and
death senre fairly obvious functions but ones
worth explicit recognition. Some relate to the
control of property, a subject talien up later.
But most fundamentally, for couples who see
themselves in an enduring relationship, the
spouse is the appropriate person for dze state
to designate as decisionmaker during a
period of incompetency and as primary
beneficiary after death on the basis of a
reasonable guess that that is the person
whom the now-incompetent or deceased
person would have chosen if she had
addressed the question in advance. That is,
the rule fulfills her probable wishes.
Do gay men and lesbians with partners
need the protection of such laws to ensure
that their partners make decisions for them
or lnherit their estates?A veiy few states
designate a long-term unmarried partner as
the preferred decisionmaker for the
incompetent person, but most states ignore
the umanied partner altogether. Similarl~~,
only a very few states provide that an
unmarried partner shall refeive any portion
of the estate of a person who dies without a
will and, co date, no state provides an-g
for a same-ses partner. Despite ths, one
could argue that gay couples do not need
such protections because they can protect
theinselves fully by simply executing a will
or a medical power of attorney. But gay men
and lesbians who are in relationships need
these protections for the same reason that

heter~se~xual
persons need them. Like most
heterosexuals,most gay men and lesbians are
reluctant to h I k about their mortality and
procrastinate about remote contingencies.
They fail to execute wdls and powers of
attorney, even though they are often aware of
the unfortunate consequences of failing to act.
Even if all persons with a same-sex
partner remembered to execute the proper
documents and had access to the needed
legal senices, other forms of government
regulation that recognize special emotional
and spiritual ties could not be similarly
handled by a scheme of private designations.
Consider four euamples. Federal law places
severe restrictions on the opportunities for
foreign-born nationals to immigrate legally to
the United States. One significant exception
to h s rule of exclusion is that a foreign-born
national who enters into a nonfraudulent
marriage with an American citizen has a
presumptive right to enter the United States
immediately as a long-term resident. No
such special provisions are made for a friend
or lover. Even brothers or parents of a U.S.
citizen are not automatically entitled to
preferential treatment, but typically face long
waiting periods before entry
Another federal law, the Family and
Medical leave Act of 1993, requires all
employers with fifty or more employees to
extend unpaid leave of up to twelve work
weeks during each year to an eligble
employee to care for a spouse with a "serious
health condition." The statute also prowdes
for leaves to care for children and for
parents, but makes no provision of any kmd
for fnends, lovers, or unmanied partners.
The federal government and many states
also ex~endan advantage to married people
when called to testify in a criminal
proceeding that bars the state from forcing a
married person to testify against his or her
spouse. Nearly all states offer a related
protection, typically in both civil and
criminal proceedings, for confidential
communications made between spouses
during the marriage.
Finally, under the law of many states, if a
thrd person injures a married person
negligently and by so doing deprives the
spouse of care and companionship, the
spouse can typically sue the injuring party
for what is called loss of "consortium,"
compensation not for financial loss but for
the loss of companionship.
The immigration reference for spouses,
the family leave provisions, the evidentiary
mles, and the consortium mles have a
common current justification: that it is fitting
for the state to recogrue the significance in
people's lives of one especially important

person to whom they are not biologcally
related. Lesbians and gay men in long-term
relationships attribute a similar level of
importance to their partners (even if they
have other gay and lesbian friends they also
consider significant).They need these rules
as much as heterosexual people do.
Gay men and women would experience
as a burden, not as a benefit, a few
regulations that attach to marriage and that
also build, in substantial part, on
assumptions about the emotional salience ol
the marital relationship. Public and private
employers, for euample, adopt antinepotism
regulations that prohibit employees from
participating in decisions to hre, promote,
or discharge their spouse or from supervising
their spouse in the workplace. Resting on
views about both emotional and economic
ties, these regulations are as justifiably
imposed on lesbians and gay men in
enduring relationships as they are on
heterosexuals: no one can be expected to be
sufficiently objective when decisions about
one's own long-term partner must be made.

B. Regulations dealing with parenting
Gay male and lesbian couples raise
chldren in this country in three common
contexts. In the first, numerically the most
common, one of the partners has already
become the biologcal parent of a child
(usually in the course of a prior relationship
with a person of the opposite sex) and then
has later formed a relationship with a samesex partner. This new partner is functionally
in the position of a "stepparent." In the
second context, a same-sex couple, ajter
beginnmg a relationshp, agree to raise a
chld together. They plan that one of them
\ d l be the biologcal parent and that, after
birth, they will serve as co-parents. In the
third context, a same-sex couple seeks to
adopt or to become the foster parents of a
child who is biologcally related to neither
of them.
Opposite-sex couples also raise children
in each of these sorts of contexts and, in
each, laws and practices in all states treat
such couples, when married, in specially
favored ways. By contrast, in each of the
three situations, a gay or lesbian partner who
is not the biological parent of the child
typically faces formidable, often insuperable,
difficulties in becoming r e c o p e d as a legal
parent at all. The laws that advantage
married couples are needed by some
heterosexual married couples who wish to
raise children, but these same laws would be
helpful to almost all lesbian and gay male
couples who wish to raise a child as legal
equals because, for them, it is always the

case that neither partner or only one is the
biological parent of the child.
In each context, most of the mles would
be ddended today as intending to serve the
best interests of children. I will focus on the
value of these rules both for children and for
lesbian and gay male adults who wish to
raise children. As to the interests of children,
a great deal has been written on the
adequacy of gay men and lesbians as parents
in the past two decades. I do not intend to
review this literature. It is well reported
elsewhere. In overwhelming measure, it
concludes that a person's sexual orientation
has no significant bearing on her or h s
parenting capacities or skills and that
children raised by lesbian and gay male
parents fare as well day by day and over time
as children raised by other parents.
As we will see, some of the difficulties
currently experienced by gay men and
lesbians who wish to raise chldren are not
formally imposed by law. Some arise under
rules that courts and agencies already have
the discretion to estend to gay people or to
same-sex couples, but rarely do. Thus, in
some contexts, the benefits of legal marriage
for same-sex couples may lie less in the rules
that would become applicable to them than
in a changed attitude toward homosexual
persons that a change in marriage laws might
help bring about on the part of legal actors
exercising authorities that already exist. Here
the symbolic and the legal intertwine.
1. The stepparent relationship

When a lesbian or gay male parent with
custody of a child begns to live with another
person of the same sex, the new person
assumes a parenting role functionally
comparable to a stepparent. The state of the
law about such parenting relationships
outside of marriage is clear: no matter how
long the gay "stepparent" lives with the
chld, no matter how deeply she becomes
involved in the care of the child, she and the
child will rarely be recognized as having a
legally significant relationship with one
another. The state of the law is essentially the
same for stepparent figures in opposite-sex
unmarried couples. They are just the
"boyfriend" or "girlfriend" or "live in" of the
custodial parent and have no legal
significance.
Perhaps surprisingly, until the recent past,
the legal position of the opposite-sex partner
who marries a custodial parent has been
little different. In all but a few states, the
stepparent married to a biologcal parent has
not been legally obliged to contribute to the
support of the child during the marriage. In
no state has the stepparent been required to

contribute to the child's support upon
divolce, no matter how long he lived w t h
the child or the extent of his voluntary
contributions The stepparent has also had
no legal entitlement upon divorce to be
considered for court-ordered vlsitation or for
sole or joint custody of the chlld It has been
absent biologcal parent who remained
financially liable for support, who remained
the one parent el~gblefor vlsitation (even ~f
he never lived w t h the child), and who
remalned second in line for custody
Recently, however, stepparents marned to
a custodial parent are coming to be
iecognlzed as parent figures for at least some
purposes, and i t is to the benefits of these
laws and court decisions that gay and lesblan
stepparents" need access A few states have
begun, for example, to protect the
relationship between a child and a
stepparent whose marnage to the biologcal
parent comes to an end No state has
imposed on the stepparent a general
obligation of support upon divorce, but
some courts and a few legslatures have
given courts the authonty to grant vlsitation
and, In unusual circumstances, custody, even
over the objection of the biologcal parent
States have also expanded the
opportunities for stepparents dunng thelr
marnage to a biologcal parent to become the
full legal parent of a stepchild through
adoption If the absent biologcal parent
consents, most states permit the marned
stepparent to adopt wthout any of the home
vlsits and family studies usually required as a
part of the adoption process Consensual
stepparent adoptions now account for over
half of all adoptions that occur in the Unlted
States Within the last few decades, most
states have recognized certain circumstances
in which stepparents livlng w t h and marned
to a biologcal parent are permitted to adopt
even over the objection of the absent
blologcal parent
A further change regarding stepparents is
found in laws relating to employment in the
labor force State worker's compensation
programs and the federal Social Secunty
suimor benefit program pelmlt a minor
stepchild livlng wtll and dependent upon a
?repparent to receive benefits after the
stepparent's death These programs replace
much of the income lost to a child upon the
aeath of the supporting stepparent Simlarly,
the Federal Family and Medical Leave ACLof
1993 requires employers to permlt a worlzer
to talze up to twelve weeks of unpald leave
to care for thelr seilously 111 chld, including
a s~epchild
Desplte these reforms that apply to
slepparents marned to a biologcal parent,
unmarned stepparent figures, of the same or

opposite sex as the custodial parent, remain
almost totally ignored by the law, wholl~7
ineligble, for example, for the special
treatment for stepparent adoption, wholly
unable to secure for a child the benefits of
workers' compensation or Social Security
survivor benefits, and ineligible for the
protections of the Federal Family and
Medical Leave Act. They also remain free of
the legal obligations that would come with
adoption - most notably the obligation to
provide financial support for the child they
adopt. Extending these benefits and
obligations to lesbians and gay men by
permitting them to marry would serve well
their needs and the needs of their chlldren
for the same reasons that they serve the
needs of mamed opposite-sex couples and
their children: children who live with a
stepparent figure who is in a committed
relationship with their biologcal parent often
become attached to and financially
dependent upon the stepparent and these
attachments warrant recoption.

aspects of marriage today as
serving prima&
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function - offering couples
opportunities to shape

2. Artificial insemination, sperm donors
and surrogacy
The second parenting context for gay
men and lesbians includes the same-sex
couples, already formed, who agree that one
of thein will become the biologcal parent of
a child whom they will raise together. Here
the issues are rather dfferent for women
than for men.
When a lesbian couple plan that one of
them will become pregnant - and large
numbers of lesbian couples seek to have
babies today in this manner - they first
must find a source of sperm. Some face
problems that are not formal barriers of law
but that are probably aWavated by the
outlaw status of their relationship. Sperm
banks in all states provide insemination
services to women, most commonly in
circumstances in which the woman is
married and her husband is sterile. While no
state expressly prohibits sperm banks from
providing services to unmarried women or
to lesbians, some doctors and sperm banks
apparently decline to do so.
Clearly legal problems arise after birth, at
the point that the lesbian partner seeks to
become recognized as a legal parent. She will
be able to achieve such recognition only if
she successiull~~
completes a formal process
of adoption. In most states, her petition to
adopt will be rejected, either because her
partner and she are of the same sex, or
because they are not mamed to one another,
or both. In a growing number of states, the
lesbian partner can be considered for
adoption, but even in these states, the best

satisfying lives as formal equals
and as they rather than the
state, see f i t

the couple can hope for is that, after
completing elaborate forms and enduring an
intrusive home study and an individualized
inquiry into the child "best interests," a
court eventually, many months after the
child's birth, will approve the application of
the nonbiological parent to adopt. The whole
process is likely to cost thousands of dollars.
Lesbian couples need a simpler and more
welconling process. They need, at a
minimum, the procedures available in most
states to legally mamed couples in
comparable circumstances. For such couples,
most states' laws provide a straightforward
procedure governing artificial inseminaton
through clinics or sperm banks. The sterile
husband simply acknowledges in writing his
concurrence in his uifek insemination and
h s acceptance of the chld as his own. He is
then treated for purposes of the la~vin
exactly the manner that he would be if he
had been the biological father. No home
study is required. No court hearing is held.
The child's birth certificate simply records
h m as the father of the child. Lesbian
couples need access to the same automatic
regstering of parenthood for the nonbiological female partner.
Similarly problematic are the situations
for gay male partners when they wish one of
them to senre as the biologcal father for a
child they plan to raise together. T h s
situation is troublesome for it necessarily
involves a much more substantial
involvement by the other biologcal parent
- the surrogate mother - than in the case
of artificial insemination through a surrogate
father, involvement under circumstances in
which there are well-founded concerns for
the intersts of the mother and of women
in general.
Reflecting differing resolutions of these
concerns, state laws vary widely today
regarding the legality and enforceability of
sul-rogacy arrangements. Some prohbit
surrogacy agreements altogether; some refuse
to enforce them but do not prohibit the
arrangements if voluntarily carried out; and
some permit enforcement if the parties
comply with various state-imposed
requirements and if the mother does not
change her mind ~ v i t l ma statutorily
prescribed period. Among the requirements
in many states is that only married couples
may enter into surrogacy arrangements with
a donor mother. Thus, under these varymg
schemes, few gay men could legally enter
into an enforceable sun-ogacyagreement,
and when they are able to do so, they would
still have to overcome the adoption problems
that lesbian couples face when both partners
seek to be recognized as the legal parents of
the cl~ildborn to one of them.

The issues surrounding surrogacy are
complex, but, whatever their resolution, gay
male couples need access to whatever
scheme is made available to opposite-sex
married couples.
--~
--

.
-.--

3. When neither partner is the biological
parent: adoption and foster care
Today, a few states prohbit lesbian and
gay men from adopting under any
circumstances and a few others prohibit
them from serving as foster parents. Most
other states make adoption or foster care
very dimcult in practice for persons who are
openly gay or lesbian. Single heterosexual
individuals are also disfavored in practice
almost everywhere. When single persons,
gay or heterosexual, are permitted to adopt,
they are often offered only the most hard-toplace children, children who are older and
have had multiple foster placements, or
chldren with multiple handicaps.
By contrast, while procedures for
adoption and foster care vary widely across
the country it is the case everywhere that,
whatever the procedure, the married
heterosexual couple stands highest in the
herarchy of preferred units for placement of
a child. The status that is accorded to
married opposite-sex couples today would
provide fully adequate legal protection for
the interests of gay male and lesbian couples
and for the children they would raise.

C. Laws regulating the economic

relationship of couples or between the
couple and the state
A considerable majority of the laws that
provide for differing treatment for married
persons deal with the mamed couple as an
economic unit. They build on beliefs or
guesses about the economic relationships
that married persons actually have and on
prescriptive views about what those
relationships ought to be. They assume that
married persons differ from most single
persons, including most single persons who
share a residence with another person, in
one or more of the following ways: the
mamed partners will live more cheaply
together than they would if they lived apart
(that is, that there are routine economies of
scale); the two will pool most or all of their
current financial resources; the two will
make decisions abou~the expenditure of
hese resources in a manner not solely

determined by which party's labors produced
the resource; the two will often engage in
divisions ol labor for their mutual benefit;
and one partner, typically the woman, will
often become economically dependent on
the other.
To the extent that these laws have an
empirical foundation, it is unclear whether
the images of opposite-sex relationships that
lie behind them will fit the circumstances ol
the sorts of gay male and lesbian couples
who would marry under a change in the law.
What evidence there is suggests that most
lesbian and gay couples in long-term
relationships believe in pooling resources
and practice it today, and that pooling is
particularly common among those who
engage in ceremonies of commitment.
The review that follows divides the many
financial regulatons that treat mamed
persons differently than single persons into
two rough sorts - those that fix the
relationship between mamed persons and
the state and those that fix the economic
relationship between the two married
persons themselves -because these sorts
of regulations typically serve quite
different ends.
--

ec -

1. The regulation of the financial
relationship between mamed persons
and the state
Tax laws and laws pertaining to
government benefits commonly treat
married persons in a distinctive manner by
regarding them for most purposes as a single
economic unit.
Consider some examples. Federal and
state income tax laws create a system of joint
returns for married couples that treats the
couples as a single economic entity Under
these provisions, when only one spouse
earns any income, the total tax liability for
the couple will be less than it would be if the
income-earning spouse filed as a single
person, a result that may be tl~oughtjustified
because two people are living on the single
earner's income. On the other hand, when
both spouses work and each earns even a
fairly moderate income, their total tax
liability will often be higher than it would
have been if each had filed as a single
person, a result that may again be thought
justified because, by pooling incomes, they
can live together more inexpensively than
two single persons living separately In many
situations, these two sets of iules produce
wholly justifiable outcomes, but their
paradoxical impact in practice is that many
workmg men and women maximize their
incomes by living together but not marrymg,
each filing a separate return, even though
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enduring ses-ascribed roles, the employnent
of only one partner is likely to be the
situation more often in opposite-sex than in
same-sex couples. Moreover, the premise of
the current rules is that mamed couples
actually share in the control of resources and
expenditures. When that premise fails, it is
doubtful whether the burdens of the joint
return should be imposed. Some observers
have raised doubts about the actual degree of
sharing of control in most heterosexual
mamed couples, and it is quite possible that
an e17enhgher proportion of gay men and
lesbians who would many would be persons
~ 7 h oin their day-to-day lives would share
only some of their income.
On the other hand, remember that not all
tax and welfare rules work to the harm of
gay couples who would mag: In some
couples, only one partner would work in the
labor force, and for them the benefits of
health coverage and the joint tax return
might be substantial. In others, both partners
would work, but only one with a job with
medical benefits. For them, the value of taxexempt benefits through the partner with
coverage could be considerable. And for
those at the hghest end of the income scale,
the benefits of the estate and gft tax
exemptions might more than offset the
disadvantages of a joint return.
Moreover, in actual practice, even for the
couple in which both partners work and
both earn significant incomes, the income
tax and other rules may in actual practice
less frequently cause behaviors experienced
as painful by the parties. When neither
partner in a couple considers hmself or
herself the "secondary" worker - when
both partners, that is, have strong ties to the
labor force - then, while the perversities of
the tax laws ma17 affect some decisions to
marry, they are less likely to lead either
partner to drop out of the labor force or feel
economically useless in a manner that he or
she resents or later comes to regret. And,
viewed from another perspective, the
opportunity for legal marriage, at the very
least, provides a choice to opposite-sex
couples whether to marry or not, a choice
from which lesbian and gay couples could
benefit for the same sorts of reasons.
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2. The regulation of the financial
relationship between mamed partners
In the United States today, states employ
either of two broad schemes of regulation to
define the economlc relatlonsh~pbetween
mamed partners Nlne states (mostly in the
West and Southwest) employ commumty
property" regmes, under whlch, to
oversimplify, the spouses own separately

whatever they bling into the marriage or
receive by gift or bequest duling the
mamage and own jointly any other assets
either of them acquires during the marriage,
including all assets acquired from their
labors. The earnings of each partner are
owned jointly by the pair. In the remaining
states, called "common law states," again to
oversimplify, the spouses own separately
whatever they acquire in their separate
names and jointly whatever they buy in both
names or whatever one by deliberate act puts
into joint control. Their earnings are their
own. These differences in law sound
significant and may affect many married
persons' perception of the nature of their
relationship, but it is probable that social
conventions linked to gender have greater
impact than formal legal rules on the way
that assets are controlled by married persons
who live together.
The mles of property do, however,
become crucial at the point of divorce, for all
states impose rules of distribution that have
significant impact on the separate spouses'
financial well-being. State divorce laws differ
widely in their structures and in their details,
but commonly produce similar outcomes.
In community property states, each
divorcing spouse is entitled to one-half of the
property acquired during the marriage. In
some states judges may deviate from this
division in extraordinary circumstances. The
remaining states have adopted more flexible
schemes of property division generally called
"equitable distribution." In these states,
courts are permitted to ignore the rules of
separate ownership and divide all property
acquired during the marriage in an equitable
manner. In practice in many equitable
distribution states, lawyers for divorcing
persons begn negotiations with an
assumption of a division closely similar to
the division imposed in community property
states: in the absence of special
circumstances, the couple d l divide equally
all assets acquired by either during the
marriage. And in practice in many
community property and equitable
distribtuion states, the actual division of
property negotiated by parties often deviates
from a fifty-fifty distribution in ways that
have little to do with formal legal mles.
What is critical for our purposes is that at
the point of divorce, under either regime,
married persons encounter formal systems of
forced allocation of assets that treat married
persons as economic partners whlle they
were together. Thus, as a single important

esample, for many long-married couples
today the largest single asset owned by either
is a pension account accumulated in the
name of one of them. In both community
property and common law slates, that part of
the pension assets attributable to the period
of the mamage will be subject to division
between the partners.
State law also responds at divorce to
imbalances in earning capacity between
spouses, imbalances that have often been
magnified during the "partnership." It does
so in common law states by allowing judges
to consider the disparate financial positions
of the parties in the distribution of property
Many states have also devised doctrines that
permit courts to compensate a spouse in
some manner for helping to increase the
human capital of the ocher partner, most
commonly by bearing the costs of putting
the partner through professional school. In
addition, both community property states
and common law states permit courts to
award periodic payments, called alimony or
maintenance, for the support of a spouse
unable adequately to provide for herself or
himself after separation. Today alimony is
awarded less frequently and for shorter
durations than in the past.
Death is another occasion when the law
imposes financial obligations because of
marriage. Under the laws of inearly all states,
a married person cannot unilaterally prevent
his spouse from inheriting part of his assets.
Thus, when a mamed person dies with a
will and the will fails to provide for the
surviving spouse, the laws of nearly all
common law states permit the suiviving
spouse to claim a "forced or "elective" share
of the estate, commonly one-third or onehalf. Much the same result is reached in
long-term marriages in community property
states because, no matter what one spouse
considers to be her separate property and
attempts to bequeath by will to others, onehalf of the assets acquired by the couple
during the marriage will be considered the
property of the other spouse at death.
Thus at both divorce and death, states
impose on married couples a prescriptive
view of the appropriate financial relationship
between them. Most states now permit
couples, at the point of mamage or during
the marriage, to contract for a different
arrangement on death or divorce than the
law would otherwise impose, though also
placing some limits to ensure hat the
decision to contract was "voluntary" and
"informed."
How, by comparison, does the law treat
the income and assets of single persons with
a long-term partner? Very differently indeed.
In both community property and common
law stam, the earnings of an unmarlied

person aind the resources bought with those
earnings are entirely the property of the
earner. Moreover, in no state today does the
state impose on the estate of an unmarried
person a forced share for a surviving partner.
An unmarried person can leave her money
to whomever she pleases, no matter how
long a relationship she may have had with a
partner.
The mles relating to the breakup of
unmarried couples vary widely among the
states. Until the last thirty years or so, courts
in nearly all states refused to intervene at all,
even when the parties had agreed to share
assets, on the ground that the cohabiting
relationship itself was immoral. A few states
still retain this approach. In most states,
however, the law has changed, responding to
the huge growth in the numbers of
unmanied opposite-sex couples living
together and to the changed social
perception of the acceptability of such
cohabitation. Courts will enforce express
agreements between unmarried persons to
support each other or to divide property
titled in the other's name. Some of the cases
have involved same-sex couples.
A few states have gone further than the
enforcement of agreements, coming closer to
imposing a marital regme. Some will enforce
"implied con:racts," the contents of which
courts infer not from words of agreement
between the partners but from the partners'
conduct - and which may in fact not reflect
any actual agreement between the parties. In
a few more states, judges will, at the request
of a separating long-term unmarried partner,
simply impose a property division that seems
"just,"even in the absence of any express or
implied agreement between the parties, In
inost states, however, unmarried partners
still have no state-prescribed obligations to
each other that apply in the absence of
agreement. Each can walk away talung
whatever is titled in his or her name.
At first blush, the rules currently applied
in inost states to the unmarried may seem to
most gay men and lesbians preferable to the
mles of forced sharing imposed on married
people. Most states, as just described, impose
on unmarried couples only what the couple
itseIf has agreed to. Such a regme may well
appeal to couples who are suspicious of the
state and couples in which neither partner is
economically dependent on the other. And,
even if they saw themselves as having some
continuing responsibilities, many would
reject the notion of the state, through its
judges, having the power to apportion fault
or responsibility between them under the
discretionary guidelines found in the
"equitable distribution" states.

Yet I think that the rules regarding the
financial aspects of divorce now in place for
married couples would serve lesbian and gay
male couples reasonably well. In the first
place, the property rules of divorce are gven
life as part of a larger set of procedures
governing divorce proceedings, procedures
that encourage, or force, couples to wind up
their financial relationshp prior to moving
on to another relationship. In the second
place, the rules regarding the division of
property for married people are, to an
increasing extent, subject to alteration by the
agreement of the parties. Before or during
mamage, the parties may contract for
different outcomes between them that will be
honored by courts if voluntarily entered. So
seen, the rules of mamage operate as a
default regme for couples who marry and
do not choose a different scheme for
themselves.
Of course, just as only a small proportion
of opposite-sex married couples enter
agreements today to vary from the rules
otherwise imposed at divorce, so it is
probable that few gay male and lesbian
couples would do so in the future. My own
belief, however, is that a default rule of
imposed sharing is preferable for gay male
and lesbian couples to the default rule of
separate property and no continuing
obligations that now exlsts for unmarried
couples. The moral claims for independence
and separate ownershp have their own
weaknesses. Some may look at the world of
forced sharing and ahmony, remember a
time when married women could own
nothing in their own name, and wish to
reject any reminders of the dependence of
women on their husbands. But the world of
independence has its own poisoned roots.
Independence in law means that the person
with legal title wins, and title, standing
alone, bears little necessary relation to the
efforts that lie behind the generation of the
asset or to the moral implications of a longshared life.
Taken together, these considerations even
support the claim that the default property
rules for marriage d l not merely serve most
gay and lesbian couples reasonably well but
will, in general, senre gay and lesbian
couples who choose to many better than
they senre opposite-sex married couples
today Gay men and lesbians compelled on
separation to share assets will be hurt less
frequently when the law's promise of sharing
fails to produce economic parity between the
partners. Because the members of such
couples are always of the same sex they more
often earn similar incomes and are less likely
to have gender-assigned expectations of
divided responsibilities for income
production during the relationship.

111. Observations

American states and the federal
government, as we have seen, treat married
individuals differently than single individuals
in three broad respects - privileging their
relationship to their spouse in certain
contexts because of their affective ties,
providing them and their partners
opportunities for legally r e c o p e d
parenting that are not provided to others,
and extending benefits and imposing
obligations based on a view of the partners
as economically intertwined.
Taken together, the rules bearing on
marriage offer significant advantages to those
to whom they apply The case I have tried to
make for gay and lesbian couples is that they
need these opportunities and choices to
much the same degree that heterosexual
couples do.
Heterosexual conservatives object to
same-sex marriage either on the ground that
sex between persons of the same sex is
immoral or pathologcal or on the ground
that permitting same-sex couples to marry
will somehow contribute to the crumbling of
the "traditional" family Feminists among gay
and lesbian scholars are also often critical of
marriage for same-sex couples, fearing
ddferent undesirable consequences for
lesbian and queer communities. Neither
objecting group focuses on the fit of specific
legal rules with the lives of sane-sex couples
and, for t h s reason, this article has not
addressed their claims. Three other sorts of
doubts that do address the legal
consequences of mamage might nonetheless
be raised about legal same-sex marriage,
even by some gay men and lesbians who
might be expected to be sympathetic.
A first objection is that there is a better
vehcle than somethng called "marriage" for
extending the appropriate protections and
opportunities to same-sex couples. Especially
for those for whom mamage is indelibly
associated with male-female relationships,
the alternative of permitting same-sex (and
opposite-sex couples who want it) to register
with the state as "domestic partners" and
extending to such partners some or all of the
consequences attached to marriage may
seem attractive.
No American state has yet adopted
domestic partner regstration, but, as we
have seen, some states, through ima,@native
court decisions and occasional statutes, are
beginning to r e c o p e unmarried couples
for particular purposes. Formal regstration
has been instituted in Denmark and Nomay,
where registered same-sex partners are
treated precisely like married couples with

regard to all financial and economic
regulations, but are not labelled as "mamed."
LJnlessa regme of domestic partnership
were developed under which same-sex
couples were treated just as opposite-sex
mamed couples are, same-sex couples
would probably find that domestic
partnership legslation excluded benefits that
they would much like to have. Thus, in
Denmark, for example, registered same-sex
couples are treated like opposite-sex mamed
couples for purposes of economic benefits,
but not for purposes of the adoption laws or
any other laws that apply to parenting.
I do not, however, wish to seem critical of
the movement for domestic partnership
registration. I believe that, though the rose
by another name will not smell as meet to
some of us. states are far more likely to
accept domestic partnership than same-sex
marriage. Denmark - and the fifty
American states - may eventually accept for
gay couples united under a name other than
"marriage" all the special rules for married
persons, including those that apply to
parenting. And those of us who favor legal
same-sex mamage must acknowledge that
just as "domestic partnership" legslation
might prokide only parts of the package of
legal consequences that now attaches to
mamage, so also legal "mamage" itseif might
be granted piecemeal as well: a state might
open legal mamage to same-sex couples but
withhold parenting or other benefits from
them, or, more fundamentally some states
might extend all state laws bearing on
maniage to same-sex couples while the
federal government withheld the incidents of
federal lacy
A second doubt about pursuing changes
in the laws of who may marry is that the
benefits of mamage are likely to be unevenly
distributed among same-sex couples. Nitya
Duclos, a Canadian scholar, has argued, for
example, that the rules of marriage would
primarily benefit lesbians and gay men who
are members of the idle class - "those who
are already fairly high up in the hierarchy of
privilege." She does not argue that this
lopsided allocation of benefits is a reason not
to permit same-sex marriage, for surely it is
not, but rather is a reason to be less exultant
about what will be achieved by it.
Duclos may be right. Those high in the
hierarchy of privilege usually come out
ahead. Still, at least in this country, many
lower-income same-sex couples will find
great benefits in mamage. Duclos claims that
"[tlhose who rely for most of their income
on state benefits are more likely [than
middle class persons] to be economically
for manyng," and it is true that a
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~i~gnificant
cost of mamage for some lowerincome persons who marry a working
person is the loss of government benefits,
such as Medicaid or Supplemental Security
Income. It is also tnle that some other rules,
such as those exempting bequests to a
spouse from the estate and gft tayes, are of
value only to those who have large sums to
give away Still, there may be compensating
gains for low income persons. Social Secunty
retirement benefits for a nonworhng spouse
and Social Security sunivor benefits are of
most importance to those without long ties
to the formal economy Medical benefits tied
to employment - including employment of
some low-earning government employees are of immense significance to spouses with
jobs that carry no health coverage at all. And
other benefits, such as the immigration rules
or rules that relate to intestate succession, are
likely to be at least as frequently invoked by
the people of modest incomes as they are by
the well-heeled. It is impossible for all sorts
of reasons to make a confident prediction of
what class-groups among gay men and
lesbians would benefit most from being
permitted to marry, but there is ample reason
to believe that the rules relating to mamage
will be appealing to many people of all
classes.
A final criticism of the laws bearing on
mamed persons is more fundamental: even
if legal marriage would offer benefits to a
broad range of same-sex couples, some
might claim that all these advantages are
illegtimate - illegtimate for both same-sex
and opposite-sex couples - because they
favor persons in two-person units over single
persons and over persons living in groups of
three or more, and because they favor
persons linked to one other person in a

sexxal-romantic relationship over persons
linked to another by friendship or other
allegances. Those of us who are gay or
lesbian must be especially sensitive to these
claims. If the deeply entrenched paradigm
we are challenging is the romantically linked
man-woman couple, we should respect the
similar claims made against the hegemony of
the two-person unit and against the romantic
foundations of marriage.
Still, nearly all reform to correct disparate
treatment in our society is incremental. It
comes at points at which the state finally
recognizes the legtimacy of the claims of
some long disfavored group. Thus, within
this century, governments have gradually
changed their posture toward the legal
position of the child born outside of
marriage and toward unmarried opposite-szs
couples in their relationships with one
another.
A next appropriate step is the step
discussed in this article - the recognition of
same-sex couples who wish to marry. And
although it is conceivable, as some have
feared, that permitting gay people to marry
mill simply reinforce the enshnned position
of married two-person units in general in
our society, it seems at least as likely that the
effect of permitting same-sex mamage will
be to make society more receptive to the
further evolution of the law. By ceasing to
conceive of marriage as a partnership
composed of one person of each sex, the
state may become more receptive to units of
three or more (all of which, of course,
include at least two persons of the same sex)
and to units composed of two people of the
same sex but who are bound by friendship
alone. All desirable changes in family law
need not be made at once.
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